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IMMUNE DISORDER: UNCERTAINTY REGARDING THE 
APPLICATION OF “STAND YOUR GROUND” LAWS 
Benjamin M. Boylston* 
On August 1, 2010,1 a woman named Marissa Alexander was arrested in 
Jacksonville, Florida, and ultimately charged with three counts of aggravated 
assault with a firearm.2 What happened on that day remains hotly disputed. 
Ms. Alexander maintains that, while she was in the bathroom at a home she 
shared with her husband, Rico Gray, Mr. Gray went through her phone and 
discovered text messages she had received from another man.3 Mr. Gray became 
incensed and strangled Ms. Alexander, but she was able to free herself and retreat 
to the garage.4 Ms. Alexander then realized that she did not have her car keys and 
would not be able to escape through the garage door because it was stuck.5 Instead, 
she armed herself with a gun she lawfully kept in the garage and re-entered the 
home.6 When Mr. Gray saw the gun, he threatened to kill her.7 At that point, 
fearing for her life, Ms. Alexander fired a “warning shot” into the wall of the house 
and left.8 
The story as told by Fourth Judicial Circuit State Attorney Angela Corey is 
significantly different.9 According to an email and accompanying information her 
office sent to state legislators, Ms. Corey believes that the couple argued over text 
messages Mr. Gray found on Ms. Alexander’s phone.10 Mr. Gray told his children 
that they would be leaving the home, at which point Ms. Alexander exclaimed, 
“I’ve got something for your ass.”11 Ms. Alexander then retrieved a gun from the 
 ________________________  
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specializing in criminal defense with offices in Daytona, Eatonville, Orlando and Tavares.  Mr. Boylston received 
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 1.  Information, State v. Alexander, No. 162010CF008579, 2010 WL 10074375, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 
26, 2010). 
 2. Id. 
 3. AC360: Marissa Alexander Speaks with Gary Tuchman “This Is My Life I’m Fighting for”, CNN (July 
17, 2013, 11:28 PM), http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2013/07/17/ac360-video-marissa-alexander-speaks-with-
garytuchmancnn-this-is-my-life-im-fighting-for/ [hereinafter AC360]. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Compare AC360, supra note 3, with E-mail from Angela Corey, Florida Assistant State Attorney, to 
the Northeast Florida legislative delegation (Mar. 12, 2014, 12:05 PM), available at 
http://www.news4jax.com/blob/view/-/25044144/data/2/-/sb8w7q/-/marissa-alexander-doc-pdf.pdf [hereinafter E-
mail].  
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
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glove compartment of her car and returned to the living room.12 When Mr. Gray 
saw his wife place a bullet in the gun’s chamber, he yelled “no” and attempted to 
scoop up his small children.13 Ms. Alexander proceeded to shoot the wall, at head 
level, after which Mr. Gray and his children fled the house.14 
Ms. Alexander’s attorney filed a motion for determination of immunity from 
prosecution and a motion to dismiss on May 24, 2011.15 A hearing was held at 
which several witnesses testified, including Ms. Alexander and Mr. Gray.16 The 
trial court denied the motion for determination of immunity from prosecution, 
ruling that “[a]fter weighing the credibility of all witnesses and other evidence, this 
Court finds that the Defendant has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence 
that she was justified in using deadly force in the defense of self.”17 Ms. Alexander 
proceeded to a jury trial and was convicted, receiving a mandatory twenty-year 
sentence under Florida’s “10-20-Life” law.18 The verdict and sentence were 
ultimately reversed on appeal due to erroneous jury instructions, and Ms. 
Alexander is scheduled to be re-tried.19  
Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” statutes do not specifically provide that such a 
pretrial immunity hearing should be held, or, for that matter, give any real guidance 
as to how it should be implemented procedurally.20 Why did Marissa Alexander’s 
attorney file a motion for a pretrial determination of immunity, and why did the 
judge apply the legal standard that she did to the motion? Had the burden of proof 
Ms. Alexander was required to meet been different—or if the burden, whatever it 
was, had instead rested with the State—the hearing might well have turned out 
differently, and Ms. Alexander might not be in legal jeopardy today.21 
This article will examine how the law of “Stand Your Ground” immunity 
developed in Florida, and how other states have subsequently treated statutes 
similar to Florida’s. It will suggest that the statute’s vagueness on the topic of 
immunity has put courts in a difficult position, and that the traditional tools of 
statutory construction are inadequate to meet this challenge. It will finally propose 
changes to the law that will better effectuate its intent. 
I.  THE FLORIDA “STAND YOUR GROUND” LAW: WHAT DOES IT MEAN? 
Prior to 2005, Florida law provided that a person could use deadly force in self-
defense if he reasonably believed that such force was necessary to prevent 
 ________________________  
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Determination of Immunity from Prosecution and Motion to 
Dismiss, State v. Alexander, No. 16-2010-CF-8579, 2011 WL 11709351, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 17, 2011).  
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at *5. 
 18. Larry Hannan, Marissa Alexander’s Sentence Could Triple in “Warning-Shot” Case, TIMES-
UNION/JACKSONVILLE.COM (Mar. 1, 2014, 7:23 PM), http://jacksonville.com/news/crime/2014-03-
01/story/marissa-alexander-sentence-could-triple-warning-shot-case.   
 19. Id. 
 20. FLA. STAT. § 776.032 (2013) (amended 2014).  
 21. See Alexander v. State, 121 So. 3d 1185, 1188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).  
2
Barry Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 2
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol20/iss1/2
Fall 2014 Immune Disorder 27 
 
imminent death or great bodily harm; however, he was first obligated to use every 
available, reasonable means to escape the danger, including retreat.22 This duty to 
retreat emanated from the common law, rather than from statutory law.23 An 
exception to this requirement was the so-called “castle doctrine,” also a product of 
the common law, in which a person in his home had no such duty to retreat before 
resorting to deadly force in self-defense.24 
By enacting what came to be known as the “Stand Your Ground” law in 2005, 
the Florida Legislature fundamentally changed this previous framework of self-
defense in three important ways.25 First, the law established a presumption that a 
person using deadly force was in reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm if he 
believed the person against whom the force was used had unlawfully entered a 
home or vehicle, and the person against whom force had been used had actually 
unlawfully entered the home or vehicle.26 Second, and perhaps most famously, it 
decreed:  
A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is 
attacked in any other place where he or she has a right to be, has 
no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and 
meet force with force, including deadly force if he or she 
reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or 
great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the 
commission of a forcible felony.27  
This provision had the effect of expanding the common law “castle doctrine” 
beyond the home to any place a law-abiding person happens to be located.28 In 
2014, this section was amended to read that a person attacked “in his or her 
dwelling, residence or vehicle” (instead of wherever he is rightfully located) has no 
duty to retreat and may act in self-defense29.  Third, it created immunity from 
criminal prosecution and civil action for a person’s justifiable use of force.30 
Subsection (1) reads as follows: 
A person who uses force as permitted in s. 776.012, s. 776.013, or s. 776.031 is 
justified in such conduct and is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action 
for the use of such force, unless the person against whom force was used is a law 
enforcement officer, as defined in s. 943.10(14), who was acting in the 
performance of his or her official duties and the officer identified himself or herself 
in accordance with any applicable law or the person using force knew or 
reasonably should have known that the person was a law enforcement officer. As 
 ________________________  
 22. Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1049 (Fla. 1999). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Fla. Staff An., S.B. 436 (Feb. 25, 2005).  
 26. FLA. STAT. § 776.013(1)(a) (2013) (amended 2014).  
 27. FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2013) (amended 2014).   
 28. Fla. Staff An., supra note 25, at 6; Fla. Staff An., S.B. 436 at 6 (Feb. 25, 2005). 
 29. Fla. Laws ch. 2014-195. 
 30. Id. 
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used in this subsection, the term “criminal prosecution” includes arresting, 
detaining in custody, and charging or prosecuting the defendant.31 
The statute further provides that a law enforcement agency may not arrest the 
person using force unless there is probable cause that this use of force was 
unlawful.32 
II. FLORIDA COURTS STRUGGLE TO APPLY “STAND YOUR GROUND” 
IMMUNITY 
Almost immediately, Florida courts struggled with the implications of section 
776.031’s immunity provision, with two competing interpretations of the statute 
emerging.33 In 2008, the First District Court of Appeal in Peterson v. State ruled 
that a defendant’s motion to dismiss based upon “Stand Your Ground” immunity 
requires a pretrial evidentiary hearing, at which the trial court’s role is to weigh any 
factual disputes and decide whether the defendant has demonstrated by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he is immune from prosecution.34 The court 
noted that there is no procedure defined in the statute for addressing the immunity 
issue.35 In its interpretation of the statute, the court drew heavily—in fact, almost 
exclusively—upon a decision from the state of Colorado regarding a strikingly 
similar law in that state.36 Because the evolution of Florida law owes so much to 
this decision, it merits examination. 
In 1987, the Supreme Court of Colorado decided People v. Guenther,  in which 
it reviewed a trial court’s dismissal of criminal charges pursuant to a claim of 
statutory immunity.37 At issue was a 1985 state statute which provided as follows, 
with respect to those using any degree of force against burglars to their home: 
Any occupant of a dwelling using physical force, including deadly 
physical force, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2) 
of this section shall be immune from criminal prosecution for the 
use of such force. . . . Any occupant of a dwelling using physical 
force, including deadly physical force, in accordance with the 
provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall be immune from 
any civil liability for injuries or death resulting from the use of 
such force.38 
 ________________________  
 31. FLA. STAT. § 776.032(1) (2013) (amended 2014). 
 32. Id. at (2).  
 33. See FLA. STAT. § 776.031 (2013) (amended 2014); Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2008); People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 976 (Colo. 1987). But see Velasquez v. State, 9 So. 3d 22– 23 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2009).  
 34. Peterson, 983 So. 2d at 29; accord Guenther, 740 P.2d at 976. 
 35. Peterson, 983 So. 2d at 29. 
 36. Id.; see also Guenther, 740 P.2d at 980. 
 37. Id. at 971. 
 38. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704.5(3)–(4) (West 1985). 
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The court ruled, as would the First District Court of Appeal of Florida over 
twenty years later, that this statute entitles a defendant moving for pretrial 
immunity to an evidentiary hearing.39 Also, they ruled that the trial court is to 
decide whether the defendant has met the burden of showing, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that he is immune from prosecution.40 The Guenther court rejected 
arguments by the State that the law merely provides an affirmative defense to be 
decided by a jury at the conclusion of a trial and not by the court at a pretrial 
motion to dismiss.41 The court noted that the immunity language of the statute was 
distinct from that of other statutes (variously reading that a defendant is “not 
responsible,” “justified,” or “may not be convicted”) that clearly created 
affirmative defenses.42 In the court’s view, because the legislature’s chosen 
language implied a bar to prosecution, dismissal was appropriate via a pretrial 
motion to dismiss.43  
The Guenther court proceeded to rule that it was reasonable to place the burden 
of proof on the defendant to show entitlement to immunity.44 This was due to the 
extraordinary degree of protection afforded to a criminal defendant by the statute; 
the fact that the defendant carries the burden at other motions to dismiss; and that 
the defendant presumably has a greater understanding of the circumstances of the 
case than the prosecution typically would.45 The court further reasoned that this 
burden should be a preponderance of the evidence, as opposed to a beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard, because this was the defendant’s burden at certain other 
analogous pretrial motions and the court did not believe the legislature intended a 
defendant to carry the enhanced burden that a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard 
would entail.46 
It is important to note that the statute being interpreted in Guenther was not a 
“Stand Your Ground” statute, at least as it is commonly understood.47 Rather, this 
statute applies to situations in which a person is acting within his home, making the 
statute a variation of the castle doctrine.48 What differentiates the statute from the 
traditional castle doctrine and makes the statute especially relevant to a “Stand 
Your Ground” statute is the addition of an immunity provision.49 
In 2009, the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida came to a very different 
conclusion than the Supreme Court of Colorado and First District Court of Appeal 
 ________________________  
 39. Guenther, 740 P.2d at 976; see also Peterson, 983 So. 2d at 29. 
 40. Guenther, 740 P.2d at 980. 
 41. Id. at 976. 
 42. Id. at 975–76. 
 43. Id. at 976. 
 44. Id. at 980. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Guenther, 740 P.2d at 980–81. 
 47. Elizabeth B. Megale, Deadly Combinations: How Self-Defense Laws Pairing Immunity with a 
Presumption of Fear Allow Criminals to “Get Away with Murder”, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 105, 126 (2010); see 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704.5 (West 1985); Guenther, 740 P.2d at 979.  
 48. Megale, supra note 46; see COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704.5(1) (West 1985); Guenther, 740 P.2d at 
980–81.  
 49. Megale, supra note 46, at 113; see COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704.5(3)–(4) (West 1985); Guenther, 740 
P.2d at 976.  
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of Florida.50 In Velasquez v. State,51 while recognizing the “efficacy” of the 
procedure set out in Guenther and Peterson, the court declined to follow these 
precedents.52 Instead, it determined that pretrial immunity motions are governed by 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4).53 Under this rule, the court should 
dismiss a case when there “are no material disputed facts and the undisputed 
material facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt against the defendant.”54 
Such a motion “shall be denied if the state files a traverse that, with specificity, 
denies under oath the material fact or facts alleged in the motion to dismiss.”55 In 
light of this interpretation, the Velasquez court held that it would be inappropriate 
for a trial court to decide factual disputes at a pretrial motion to dismiss—if factual 
disputes existed at all, the motion should be denied.56 The court certified conflict 
with Peterson in a subsequent case, inviting review by the Supreme Court of 
Florida.57 
That review occurred in 2010’s Dennis v. State.58 The Supreme Court of 
Florida sided with the First District Court of Appeal and its reasoning in Peterson, 
holding that a defendant is entitled to a pretrial hearing at which the trial court 
resolves factual disputes.59 The Supreme Court of Florida rejected the Velasquez 
holding that “Stand Your Ground” immunity can be granted only through a Rule 
3.190(c)(4) motion to dismiss, because the plain meaning of the statute does not 
limit immunity to situations in which material facts are undisputed.60 A motion to 
dismiss is instead properly heard through Rule 3.190(b), under which, in a variety 
of contexts, courts are permitted to resolve factual disputes.61 The Dennis court 
went on to reject the State’s argument that a pretrial immunity hearing merely tests 
the existence of probable cause (recall that the law makes this the standard by 
which law enforcement must be convinced that the force used was unlawful before 
it can make an arrest).62 The court noted that since the law already provides a non-
adversarial probable cause determination upon arrest, limiting a determination of 
immunity to probable cause would render the very concept of immunity 
superfluous.63 Therefore, the statute must be interpreted in such a way so as to give 
the defendant added protection.64  
 ________________________  
 50. Megale, supra note 46, at 123–24. 
 51. 9 So. 3d 22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 52. Id. at 24. But see Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Guenther, 740 P.2d at 
976. 
 53. Velasquez, 9 So. 3d at 23–24. 
 54. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(c)(4). 
 55. Id. at (d). 
 56. Velasquez, 9 So. 3d at 24. 
 57. Dennis v. State, 17 So. 3d 305 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); see Megale, supra note 46, at 124. 
 58. 51 So. 3d 456 (Fla. 2010). 
 59. Id. at 463–64; see also Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 60. Dennis, 51 So. 3d at 464; see also FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(c)(4). But see Velasquez, 9 So. 3d at 24. 
 61. Dennis, 51 So. 3d at 464; see also FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(b). 
 62. Dennis, 51 So. 3d at 463; FLA. STAT. § 776.032 (2013) (amended 2014). 
 63. Dennis, 51 So. 3d at 463. 
 64. Id. 
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Dennis held that “the procedure set out by the First District in Peterson best 
effectuates the intent of the legislature.”65 The law in question, however, was 
sufficiently opaque that two district courts of appeal interpreted it in radically 
different ways, requiring intervention from the Supreme Court of Florida.66 The 
aftermath was the imposition of a procedure heavily influenced by one created 
twenty years before, in a different state, relating to a different statute (which was 
itself out of necessity based on speculation as to what exactly was intended by the 
Colorado Legislature).67 Other states have similarly struggled to implement “Stand 
Your Ground”-style immunity provisions.68  
III.  OTHER STATES ADDRESS THEIR CRIMINAL IMMUNITY PROVISIONS  
After Florida’s passage of its “Stand Your Ground” laws, numerous states 
followed suit.69 However, only a handful of these states—Alabama, Kansas,  
Kentucky,  Georgia,  Oklahoma,  South Carolina,  and North Carolina—have 
emulated Florida’s criminal immunity provision.70 None of these laws explicitly 
create a procedure for courts to determine whether, and under what circumstances, 
a person using deadly force is immune from prosecution.71  
This question of how immunity provisions should be understood and applied 
has posed difficulties for several of these states, as it did in Florida.72 In 2011, the 
Supreme Court of South Carolina held—relying on, and mirroring, the result in 
Dennis and Peterson from Florida—that a defendant claiming immunity under 
South Carolina’s “Stand Your Ground” law is entitled to a pretrial immunity 
hearing, at which the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence.73 
However, the court did not state explicitly which party bears the burden of 
persuasion at such a hearing (although it is fair to assume it would be the 
defendant, given the court’s reliance on the Florida cases reaching that 
 ________________________  
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. at 458. 
 67. See id. at 464; see People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 979 (Colo. 1987); accord COLO. REV. STAT.  § 
18-1-704.5(3) (West 1985). 
 68. See, e.g., State v. Ultreras, 295 P.3d 1020 (Kan. 2013); State v. Duncan, 709 S.E.2d 662 (S.C. 2011).  
 69. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Missouri, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Ohio, West 
Virginia, Wyoming, Montana, New Hampshire, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. “Stand 
Your Ground” Laws: Civil Rights and Public Safety Implications of the Expanded Use of Deadly Force Before the 
S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 4–5 (2013) (written testimony of Ronald Sullivan Jr., Professor of Law at 
Harvard Law School). 
 70. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (2014); KAN. STAT.  § 21-5231 (2014); KY. REV. STAT.  § 503.085 
(West 2014); GA. CODE  § 16-3-24.2 (2014); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1289.25 (2014); S.C. CODE  § 16-11-450 
(2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.3 (2013). 
 71. ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (2014); KAN. STAT.  § 21-5231 (2014); KY. REV. STAT.  § 503.085 (West 
2014); GA. CODE  § 16-3-24.2 (2014); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1289.25 (2014); S.C. CODE  § 16-11-450 (2013); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.3 (2013). 
 72. See, e.g., State v. Curry, 752 S.E.2d 263, 266 (S.C. 2013); Thompson v. State, 702 S.E.2d 198, 210 
(Ga. 2010); Jackson v. State, 993 So. 2d 45, 47 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007); State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 32, 34–35 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1998).  
 73. State v. Duncan, 709 S.E.2d 662, 665 (S.C. 2011). 
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conclusion).74 At least one Alabama court has done the same: in 2010, a trial court 
dismissed a murder case pursuant to a pretrial immunity hearing, ruling that the 
“defendant having met its [sic] burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he is entitled to the immunity provisions of Alabama Code 13A-3-23 
(d) and (e), his motion to dismiss on the issue of immunity is hereby granted and 
the indictment is hereby dismissed.”75  
The Supreme Courts of Kentucky and Kansas have arrived at very different 
conclusions.76 Like Florida, the “Stand Your Ground” statutes in these states refer 
to a probable-cause standard; the Kentucky law is virtually identical to Florida’s, 
and similarly provides that a law enforcement agency may not arrest a person 
unless there is probable cause to believe the self-defense was unlawful.77 While the 
Supreme Court of Florida in Dennis found this language inadequate to provide the 
burden of proof at a pretrial immunity hearing, the Supreme Court of Kentucky 
(lamenting that the trial court’s confusion on this subject was understandable in 
light of the statute’s lack of guidance) found this language dispositive.78 The 
Supreme Court of Kentucky held that, because probable cause is the only standard 
referred to by the statute, probable cause remains the burden of proof at pretrial 
immunity hearings.79 However, the court ruled that the State, not the defendant, 
bears this burden.80 The court rejected calls for a Florida-style preponderance-of-
the-evidence standard, reasoning that the language of the statute did not support 
it.81 
In 2013, the Supreme Court of Kansas surveyed the decisions described above 
in construing the Kansas “Stand Your Ground” law.82 In what seems to have 
become a recurring theme in this area, the court expressed disappointment that the 
immunity statute provided so little procedural guidance.83 While holding (like 
every other court to have addressed the issue) that a defendant is entitled to a 
pretrial immunity hearing, the court ultimately charted a course similar to that of 
Kentucky, and determined that the State has the burden to establish that there is 
probable cause to show that the force used was unjustified.84  
The determining factor in the Supreme Court of Kansas’s decision was an 
additional section of the Kansas law providing that the prosecutor “may commence 
a criminal prosecution upon a determination of probable cause.”85 The court 
 ________________________  
 74. Id. 
 75. David Atchison, Case Dismissed Against Son in Father’s Death, THE ANNISTON STAR (Sept. 15, 
2010), http://www.annistonstar.com/the_daily_home/dh_news/article_3477b941-5c33-5e49-84ed-
af921ec51be7.html?mode=jqm. 
 76. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d 740, 755 (Ky. 2009); State v. Ultreras, 295 P.3d 
1020, 1039 (Kan. 2013).  
 77. KY. REV. STAT.  § 503.085 (West 2014). 
 78. See Rodgers, 285 S.W.3d at 755. 
 79. Id. at 756. 
 80. Id. at 755. 
 81. Id. at 754. 
 82. State v. Ultreras, 295 P.3d 1020, 1027–31 (Kan. 2013). 
 83. Id. at 1030.  
 84. Id. at 1031. 
 85. Id. at 1026. 
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asserted that the imposition of a probable cause burden at an immunity hearing is 
appropriate in Kansas, as it may not have been under Florida law, for two 
reasons.86 First, because the Kansas statute explicitly gives probable cause as the 
standard for initiating a prosecution—as opposed to merely before making an 
arrest—there was no reason for it to impose a different burden for an immunity 
hearing.87 The Supreme Court of Kansas alleged that the Florida court was required 
to impose a different burden in order to make the immunity statute it was 
interpreting meaningful.88 Second, the court held that a probable-cause standard for 
immunity from prosecution under the “Stand Your Ground” statute meaningfully 
adds to the procedure already employed by the Kansas court system in 
determining, at the time of arrest, whether there was probable cause to believe a 
crime was committed, and whether the defendant committed the crime.89 This is so, 
according to the court, because the immunity hearing adds an additional procedure: 
the courts must now determine whether there was probable cause to believe that the 
deadly force used was unjustified.90 Consequently, the imposition of a probable-
cause standard at an immunity hearing is not superfluous.91 
IV. WHY DO DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF IMMUNITY MATTER?  
As has been discussed, Florida began a trend in 2005 of “Stand Your Ground” 
legislation, which was subsequently adopted by numerous states.92 These laws tend 
to have more similarities than differences and in many cases are identical.93 These 
 ________________________  
 86. Id. at 1031. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Ultreras, 295 P.3d at 1031. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. While recognizing the difficulty of the task the court was facing, this reasoning is tenuous on both 
counts. See Megale, supra note 46, at 129–30. It first conflates the standard, provided in the statute, for a 
prosecutor to initiate a criminal prosecution with the standard for deciding the ultimate legal question, to be 
determined by a court, for whether someone is legally justified in the use of deadly force. See id. at 130–31. The 
plain meaning of the text applies a probable cause standard to the former question, but not necessarily the latter. 
See id. Second, with respect to the procedure already employed upon arrest, there is no meaningful difference 
between whether a crime has been committed and whether a defendant was justified in the use of force. See id. If 
the defendant was justified in using force then no crime was committed. One cannot adequately address the first 
issue without inquiry into the second. See id. 
 92. See Sullivan, supra note 68. 
 93. See Ryan Sibley, 10 States Copied Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” Law, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION 
(Mar. 28, 2012), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2012/03/28/10-states-copied-floridas-stand-your-ground-law/.   
After Florida passed its law, the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) adopted 
its legislative language as one of the model bills it proposes to legislators across the country 
on behalf of its member associations, in this case the NRA. A Sunlight Foundation analysis 
using automated textual analysis found that not only are the laws similar, but at least 10 of 
the states based their legislation on nearly identical bills to the one Florida passed and 
ALEC adopted. 
. . . . 
The analysis was able to detect striking similarities and identical phrases across multiple 
bills, including the phrase, “[a] person is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of 
imminent peril of death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another when using 
defensive force that is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm …,” which is 
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similarities are themselves telling as to the common intentions of various state 
legislatures adopting these statutes; and in some cases, legislatures have explicitly 
given nearly identical rationales for the passage of the laws.94 With respect to the 
immunity provisions that several of the “Stand Your Ground” states have chosen to 
enact, the statutes are likewise similar in that (as courts have repeatedly noted) they 
give no guidance at all as to how immunity should be determined as a procedural 
matter.95 This being the case, it would stand to reason that the various states’ laws 
would be interpreted in a way such that their effects are substantially similar. That 
this has not happened (as addressed above) is a problem.96 
There is consensus that “Stand Your Ground” statutory immunity is not an 
affirmative defense, but rather a true immunity to be raised pretrial.97 This 
understanding seems to be the right one, for two reasons. First is the unanimity of 
opinion from courts that have addressed the subject that a pretrial hearing to 
determine immunity is appropriate.98 Second, the language of the laws themselves 
makes clear that the principle of a pretrial immunity hearing is legally sound on its 
merits.99 As the court stated in Rodgers v. Commonwealth, by enacting an 
immunity provision, the legislature “has made unmistakably clear its intent to 
create a true immunity, not simply a defense to criminal charges. This aspect of the 
new law is meant to provide not merely a defense against liability, but protection 
against the burdens of prosecution and trial as well.”100 In every state, the creation 
through case law of a pretrial immunity hearing does seem to best effectuate 
legislative intent.101  
  
just one of the provisions of the law that is intended to protect people who may have killed 
another person from being arrested or prosecuted. 
Id. 
 94. E.g., S.B. 436, 107th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005); 2005 Fla. Laws ch. 27; H.B. 4301, 116th Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2005). By way of example, the preambles to both the Florida and South Carolina “Stand Your 
Ground” bills (Chapter 2005-27, Laws of Florida and South Carolina Bill 4301) contain substantially identical 
language to the effect that the legislatures find that it is proper for law abiding people to protect themselves, their 
families and others and to be immune from prosecution in so doing; that their respective state constitutions 
guarantee the right to bear arms; that persons residing or visiting the state have a right to expect to be unmolested 
in their homes and vehicles; and that no person or crime victim should be required to surrender his safety to a 
criminal or needlessly retreat. Id. 
 95. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d 740, 754 (Ky. 2009); Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 
27, 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); see also ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (2014); KAN. STAT.  § 21-5231 (2014); KY. 
REV. STAT.  § 503.085 (West 2014); GA. CODE  § 16-3-24.2 (2014); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1289.25 (2014); S.C. 
CODE  § 16-11-450 (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.3 (2013).  
 96. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d 740 (Ky. 2009); State v. Ultreras, 295 P.3d 1020, 
1039 (Kan. 2013).  
 97. See, e.g., People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 976 (Colo. 1987); Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27, 29 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).  
 98. See, e.g., Guenther, 740 P.2d at 976; Dennis v. State, 17 So. 3d 305, 306 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).  
 99. See, e.g., Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010); Mederos v. State, 102 So. 3d 7, 9 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2012); Hair v. State, 17 So. 3d 804, 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).  
 100. Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d 740, 753 (Ky. 2009). 
 101. See, e.g., People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971 (Colo. 1987); Dennis, 51 So. 3d 456. 
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As discussed above, the form this immunity hearing is to take varies in 
important ways.102 Some courts (Florida, South Carolina, and perhaps Alabama) 
impose a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard on the defendant;103 others (such 
as Kansas and Kentucky) place a probable-cause burden on the prosecution.104 This 
difference is more than an abstraction and has very practical implications for a 
person claiming immunity under these statutes. 
“Preponderance of the evidence” means:  
The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by 
the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence 
that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight 
that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all 
reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial 
mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.105  
 
In other words, it is “evidence that more likely than not tends to prove a certain 
proposition.”106  
“Probable cause,” on the other hand, means a “reasonable ground to suspect 
that a person has committed or is committing a crime or that a place contains 
specific items connected with a crime.”107 The Supreme Court of the United States 
in Illinois v. Gates stated that probable cause:  
requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal 
activity, not an actual showing of such activity. By hypothesis, 
therefore, innocent behavior frequently will provide the basis for a 
showing of probable cause; to require otherwise would be to sub 
silentio impose a drastically more rigorous definition of probable 
cause than the security of our citizens demands.108  
The court also contrasted the concepts of probable cause (required for a 
magistrate to issue a warrant) and preponderance of the evidence: “the quanta of 
proof appropriate in ordinary judicial proceedings are inapplicable to the decision 
to issue a warrant. Finely-tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
 ________________________  
 102. See, e.g., State v. Curry, 752 S.E.2d 263, 266 (S.C. 2013); Thompson v. State, 702 S.E.2d 198, 201 
(Ga. 2010); Jackson v. State, 993 So. 2d 45, 47 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007); State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 32, 34–35 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1998). 
 103. See State v. Duncan, 709 S.E.2d 662, 665 (S.C. 2011); Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 459–60 (Fla. 
2010); Atchison, supra note 74.  
 104. See State v. Ultreras, 295 P.3d 1020, 1027 (Kan. 2013); Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d 740, 
754–55 (Ky. 2009). 
 105. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1301 (9th ed. 2009). 
 106. 24 FLA. JUR. 2D Evidence and Witnesses § 520 (2014). 
 107. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1321 (9th ed. 2009). 
 108. 462 U.S. 213 at n.13 (1983). 
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or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the 
magistrate’s decision.”109 
It is clear, then, that probable cause is both significantly less formal and 
rigorous than a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.110 It is not difficult to 
imagine that a defendant, such as Marissa Alexander, could be found immune from 
prosecution in one state but not another, based solely upon which immunity 
standard is imposed and which party has the burden of proof. As one court has 
observed, in the context of “Stand Your Ground” immunity from prosecution, 
“[t]he issue of who bears the burden of proof may well be significant where the 
case is an extremely close one, or where only limited evidence is presented for the 
trial court’s consideration.”111  
It is unlikely that statutes with strikingly similar language, enacted within a few 
years of each other to address the same perceived problem, could plausibly be 
intended to result in such different outcomes. Unfortunately, the failure of 
legislatures to specify the procedure by which “Stand Your Ground” immunity 
should be applied has resulted in courts being forced to craft a solution using the 
statutory construction tools available to them.112 These have proven to be 
inadequate for the challenge at hand: as previously discussed, courts have arrived 
at very different results based upon the existence—or nonexistence—of statutory 
provisions that were unlikely to have been drafted with such differing results in 
mind.113  
V.  ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE FLORIDA “STAND YOUR 
GROUND” LAW’S LACK OF PROCEDURAL DIRECTION  
The problems caused by judicially created immunity procedures have the 
potential to go beyond uncertainties about the standard and burden of proof, as an 
example from Florida illustrates.114 Recall that the Supreme Court of Florida, in 
Dennis, held that the appropriate procedural vehicle for motions to dismiss 
pursuant to the “Stand Your Ground” statute is Rule 3.190(b) and not Rule 
3.190(c)(4).115 This distinction had the effect of allowing trial judges to weigh 
factual disputes arising at an immunity hearing, rather than simply dismissing the 
motion because a factual dispute existed (as is required by Rule 3.190(c)(4) 
motions).116 However, all motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 3.190 must be filed 
at or before arraignment, with certain exceptions, including the aforementioned 
 ________________________  
 109. Id. at 235. 
 110. See, e.g., id.; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 
160, 175–76 (1949). 
 111. Bretherick v. State, 135 So. 3d 337, 341 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
 112. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d 740, 754 (Ky. 2009); Dennis v. State, 17 So. 3d 305, 
306 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 113. See, e.g., State v. Ultreras, 295 P.3d 1020, 1023, 1025 (Kan. 2013); Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 463 
(Fla. 2010). 
 114. See id. 
 115. Id. at 464. 
 116. Id. 
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Rule 3.190(c)(4) motions in which there are no undisputed facts and those facts do 
not establish a prima facie case of guilt.117 The motion is otherwise waived unless 
the court, in its discretion, allows it to be filed and heard at a later date.118 
The problematic implications of shoehorning “Stand Your Ground” motions to 
dismiss into a Rule 3.190(b) motion should be obvious to anyone familiar with the 
way Florida’s criminal justice system functions: public defenders are often not 
appointed until the arraignment date itself, at which defendants fill out affidavits of 
indigency and are found by the arraigning judge to be indigent.119 A public 
defender appointed at arraignment will, of course, be unprepared (as any attorney 
would be in such a situation) to immediately file a complex motion to dismiss.120 
Furthermore, even in situations in which public defenders are appointed at the time 
of the initial appearance following an arrest but before arraignment, given the well-
documented, excessive workloads they face, it is very likely these attorneys will 
not have a chance to fully investigate the case before the arraignment occurs.121 
These issues are not limited to public defenders: given that arraignment usually 
occurs at an early stage of a case, a privately retained attorney is often not retained 
until after arraignment has passed, and with it the entitlement to file a “Stand Your 
Ground” motion to dismiss.122 
In practice, nearly all judges will use the discretion granted to them under the 
rule and allow “Stand Your Ground” motions to dismiss to be filed and heard after 
arraignment; in fact, if courts deny such motions because they are untimely under 
the rule, appellate courts may find this to be an abuse of discretion.123 This situation 
 ________________________  
 117. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(c). Rule 3.190(c) states that the other motions to dismiss that can be filed and 
heard at any time relate to charges for which the defendant has been pardoned; has been previously placed in 
jeopardy; or which the defendant has previously been granted immunity. Id. It is unlikely that a motion to find the 
defendant immune for the first time, as a “Stand Your Ground” motion seeks to do, could plausibly be held to fall 
within this last category.  
 118. Id. 
 119. See, e.g., Misdemeanor Cases, POLK COUNTY CLERK OF COURTS, 
http://www.polkcountyclerk.net/Misdemeanor-Cases/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2014). “At your arraignment, you will 
have an opportunity to complete an Affidavit of Indigent Status form, and request the appointment of a public 
defender.” Id.; see also FAQ, 5TH CIRCUIT PUBLIC DEFENDER, http://www.pdo5.org/faq (last visited Oct. 3, 2014). 
“If the Public Defender has not been appointed prior to the arraignment date the accused MUST ATTEND THE 
ARRAIGNMENT. At that time the judge will determine if the accused qualifies or not for the services of the 
Public Defender.” Id. Such procedures are common in every circuit with which the author is familiar. 
 120. See generally J.T.W., Annotation, Brevity of Time Between Assignment of Counsel and Trial as 
Affecting Question Whether Accused Is Denied Right to Assistance of Counsel, 84 A.L.R. 544 (Originally 
published in 1933) (discussing the general rule that a reasonable time for the preparation of a defendant’s case 
must be allowed between the time of assignment of counsel by the court and the date of trial).  
 121. See Public Defender v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 270 (Fla. 2013). 
 122. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(c) (providing that a motion to dismiss under 3.190(b) must be submitted 
either before or at arraignment); see also Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010) (holding that Florida Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 3.190(b) is the appropriate procedure for bringing a motion to dismiss based on Stand Your 
Ground immunity). 
 123. It could be argued that a motion to dismiss must be raised at or before arraignment. See id. However, it 
has been recognized that jurisdictional issues may be raised at any time, and that the proper procedure for 
challenging a court’s denial of a motion to dismiss based on “Stand Your Ground” immunity is to file a writ of 
prohibition. 15 FLA. JUR. 2D Criminal Law–Procedure § 1468; see Mederos v. State, 102 So. 3d 7, 11 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2012). A writ of prohibition is proper because such an issue involves the determination of whether the 
lower court has continuing jurisdiction over the defendant. Little v. State, 111 So. 3d 214, 216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2013). 
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has yet to be addressed by a Florida appellate court.124 However, the fact that 
“Stand Your Ground” motions to dismiss must be filed under a rule with such an 
unrealistic timeframe is indicative of the poor fit existing law provides such 
motions. It seems highly unlikely that the legislature intended “Stand Your 
Ground” immunity to apply to citizens defending themselves only when a court, in 
its discretion, chooses to hear the motion. At least theoretically, though, this is 
exactly what the legislature did by not providing an independent procedure for 
adjudicating immunity under the statute it passed, thereby forcing courts to create a 
procedure from the laws pertaining to motions to dismiss that are already on the 
books.  
VI. THE SOLUTION 
As the several courts who have addressed the issue have observed, the various 
“Stand Your Ground” laws provide little guidance as to how these laws should be 
implemented procedurally with respect to immunity from prosecution.125 This has 
led the courts to use tools of statutory construction to divine what the legislature 
intended—with sometimes radically different outcomes despite substantially 
similar statutes.126 The Florida Legislature can, and should, fix the problem in this 
state by amending the law expressly to provide a procedure that courts are to 
follow, including the appropriate burden (or burdens) of proof. In determining what 
that burden should be, the legislature should be mindful that neither the solution 
adopted by Kansas and Kentucky (a probable cause burden on the state),127 nor 
those adopted by Florida and other states (a preponderance of the evidence burden 
on the defendant)128 are perfect—both have advantages and disadvantages. 
The path Kansas and Kentucky have taken is consistent with the fundamental 
principle of our justice system that a person is presumed not guilty, and the State 
has the burden of proving otherwise.129 On the other hand, a probable-cause 
standard is far too easily met by the State and merely replicates a determination of 
probable cause that will already have been made twice: first by the police in 
making an arrest or seeking an arrest warrant, and then by a judge or magistrate 
either in signing the arrest warrant or making a probable cause determination 
shortly after the defendant’s warrantless arrest.130  
 ________________________  
 124. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 122. Although courts in Florida have come close to deciding the 
issue, they have not directly addressed the issue of denying a motion to dismiss based on untimeliness, and thus an 
inference must be raised as outlined above. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 122; see also Dennis v. State, 51 So. 
3d 456 (Fla. 2010). The only issue that the Florida appellate courts have addressed in the denial of a motion to 
dismiss based on “Stand Your Ground” is the need for courts to hold an evidentiary hearing; they have yet to 
address the issue of denial for untimeliness. See, e.g., id.  
 125. State v. Ultreras, 295 P.3d 1020, 1030 (Kan. 2013). 
 126. See generally id. at 1027–30 (providing an extensive and detailed overview of how courts in other 
states, including Florida, have used tools of statutory construction to come to different results on the issue, despite 
similar statutes). 
 127. Id. at 1031; Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d 740, 754 (Ky. 2009); see also KAN. STAT.  § 21-
5231 (2010); KY. REV. STAT.  § 503.085 (West 2006). 
 128. See Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 460, 463 (Fla. 2010). 
 129. See Ultreras, 295 P.3d at 1031; Rodgers, 285 S.W.3d at 754. 
 130. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.133(a)(1), (3)–(4), (b)(5). 
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The preponderance burden of proof that has been adopted by Florida could be 
described as a “Goldilocks” solution.131 It is more rigorous than (and different 
from) the probable cause determination that was made at the outset of the case, but 
less rigorous than (and also different from) the reasonable-doubt standard 
employed at trial.132 In essence, a preponderance standard at the pretrial immunity 
stage provides a sensible, appealing, and escalating scale of proof in the context of 
a criminal prosecution: probable cause for the arrest and charging of the defendant; 
a preponderance of the evidence for pretrial immunity; and reasonable doubt for 
conviction of the crime.  
Placing this burden on the defendant, as Florida’s approach currently does, has 
some precedent in Florida law.133 The closest analogue to “Stand Your Ground” 
immunity from prosecution is the concept of “transactional immunity.”134 Until its 
amendment in 1982,135 Florida Statute, section 914.04 and its predecessor statute 
provided that “no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or 
forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which 
he may . . . testify or produce evidence” that he was compelled by the prosecutor or 
court to give over a claim of Fifth Amendment privilege.136 This blanket immunity 
from prosecution was known as transactional immunity.137 Courts historically 
placed the burden of asserting and proving a claim of transactional immunity on 
the defendant.138  
This is not dispositive, however, because while transactional immunity and 
“Stand Your Ground” immunity have similar effects, the reasons for their existence 
are very different. The former was created to aid the State in the prosecution of 
crimes and to circumvent the privilege against self-incrimination that might be 
invoked by a criminal,139 but “Stand Your Ground” immunity was created to secure 
 ________________________  
 131. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2832 (2011) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). Judge Kagan coined the term “Goldilocks solution” in describing the amount of money needed to fund 
an election campaign—”not too large, not too small, but just right.” Id. 
 132. To understand the differences in the burden-of-proof standards, compare the definition of 
“preponderance of the evidence” with the definitions of “probable cause” and “reasonable doubt.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1301, 1321, 1380 (9th ed. 2009). 
 133. See Richards v. State, 197 So. 772, 775 (Fla. 1940). 
 134. See also Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 463 (Fla. 2010). Compare FLA. STAT. § 776.032 (2013) 
(amended 2014) with FLA. STAT. § 914.04 (1997). 
 135. 1982 Fla. Laws ch. 393, § 1. 
 136. FLA. STAT. § 914.04 (1997). 
 137. This concept should be distinguished from “use immunity,” for which section 914.04 still provides to 
this day:  
[I]t is important to note the distinction between use immunity, which the trial court ordered, 
and transactional immunity, which it did not. The former simply forbids the testimony given 
under the immunity grant to be used against the witness in any criminal prosecution of him; 
the latter provides the witness with immunity from prosecution for the matter concerning 
which his testimony was elicited.  
State v. Harris, 425 So. 2d 118, 119 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (citing State ex rel Hough v. Popper, 287 So. 2d 282 
(Fla. 1973); Alford v. Cornelius, 380 So. 2d. 1183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Toogood, 349 So. 2d 1203 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)). 
 138. See Richards v. State, 197 So. 772, 775 (Fla. 1940). 
 139. See Tsavaris v. Scruggs, 360 So. 2d 745, 749 (Fla. 1977) (“In construing Section 914.04, Florida 
Statutes (1975), it is important to bear in mind ‘the very purpose for its enactment . . . [is] to aid the state in the 
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fundamental rights for the law-abiding individual citizen.140 For this reason, placing 
the burden of proving “Stand Your Ground” immunity completely on the defendant 
seems inconsistent with the Florida Legislature’s stated objectives of providing 
maximum protection to those acting in defense of themselves or others.141  
Instead, the legislature should be guided by the procedure employed when a 
defendant claims self-defense at trial. When:  
[s]elf-defense is asserted, a defendant has the burden of producing 
enough evidence to establish a prima facie case demonstrating the 
justifiable use of force. Once a defendant makes a prima facie 
showing of self-defense, the State has the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-
defense.142 
The legislature should provide that a hearing to determine “Stand Your 
Ground” immunity mirrors this procedure, but that the State need only establish by 
a preponderance of the evidence that force was unjustified under the law, rather 
than beyond a reasonable doubt, as it must at trial. This solution would strike the 
best balance between the traditional burden placed on the defendant in seeking 
immunity and the legislature’s declared policy objective of providing maximum 
protection for those acting in lawful self-defense. The Supreme Court of Florida 
should contribute to this clarification of the procedure by amending Rule 3.190 to 
provide an independent pathway for “Stand Your Ground” immunity motions to be 
heard apart from the current categories that the rule provides, making clear that 
such a motion can be heard at any time. 
This proposed legislative action calls for the legislature to involve itself with 
the procedure courts are to follow, which might raise concerns that the legislature 
is violating the Florida Constitution’s separation of powers provision.143 Article II, 
section 3 provides that the “powers of the state government shall be divided into 
legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch 
shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless 
  
prosecution of crimes.’ Immunity statutes are mechanisms for securing witnesses’ self-incriminating testimony in 
the prosecution of third parties.” (quoting in part State v. Schell, 222 So. 2d 757, 758 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969)). 
 140. See 2005 Fla. Laws ch. 27. 
 141. Id. (the bill creating the Florida “Stand Your Ground” law):  
[T]he Legislature finds that it is proper for law-abiding people to protect themselves, their 
families, and others from attackers and others without fear of prosecution or civil action for 
acting in defense of themselves or others . . . no person or victim of crime should be 
required to surrender his or her personal safety to a criminal, nor should a person or victim 
be required to needlessly retreat in the face of intrusion or attack . . . . 
 
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 790.25(1), (4), (5) (2006); FLA. STAT. § 790.251(3) (2008) (reflecting the state’s 
legislative policy that citizens have the right to bear arms for self-defense and other lawful purposes, and that these 
statutes in general should be “liberally construed” in favor of such purposes). 
 142. Fields v. State, 988 So. 2d 1185, 1188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Fowler v. State, 921 So. 2d 
708, 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).  
 143. See FLA. CONST. art. 2, § 3. 
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expressly provided herein.”144 “Generally, the legislature has the [sole] power to 
enact substantive law, while the [Supreme] Court [of Florida] has the [sole] power 
to enact procedural law.”145 A well-established exception to this general rule, 
however, is when a statute creates a substantive right, the procedural provisions of 
the legislation that are necessary to the implementation of that right are considered 
constitutional.146 Because the “Stand Your Ground” law unquestionably creates a 
substantive right to immunity from prosecution under certain circumstances, the 
legislature has the power to enact procedures to carry it out.147 The legislature 
should exercise this power—as should other state legislatures that have chosen to 
follow Florida’s lead in creating “Stand Your Ground” immunity.  
Defendants, such as Marissa Alexander, deserve to have the question of 
whether they are entitled to immunity from prosecution under the “Stand Your 
Ground” law adjudicated in a clear and logical fashion. This is not currently the 
case. Modifying the law is therefore necessary to achieve its stated goal: that those 
acting in lawful self-defense fear neither the criminal who was threatening them, 
nor the government that determines their guilt.148 
ADDENDUM 
After the writing of this article, the Florida Legislature acted to amend Florida 
Statutes 776.012, 776.013, 776.032, and 776.033.  Among other changes, these 
amendments permit the threatened use of force under circumstances in which the 
actual use of force would have been justified (presumably a nod to the firing of 
warning shots).  They also clarify the circumstances under which the presumption 
of reasonable fear does not apply, from someone claiming self-defense being 
engaged in “unlawful activity” at the time he used force, to being engaged in the 
less vague “criminal activity” at the time he used force. The legislature clearly took 
note of some of the problems inherent in George Zimmerman and Marissa 
Alexander’s cases, but these newest iterations of Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” 
laws appear to be more reactionary poultices than meaningful attempts to address 
the laws’ shortcomings.  While these changes may be a minor victory for those 
seeking to be safe in their homes and daily lives, they do not even begin to address 
the issues of burden of proof and the appropriate procedure for courts to adjudicate 
self-defense immunity claims.  The laws will remain deeply flawed until such 
systemic problems are solved. 
 
 ________________________  
 144. Id. 
 145. Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So. 2d 52, 59 (Fla. 2000). 
 146. See Caple v. Tuttle’s Design-Build Inc., 753 So. 2d 49, 54 (Fla. 2000); Smith v. Dep’t. of Ins., 507 So. 
2d 1080, 1092 (Fla. 1987). 
 147. See also FLA. STAT. § 776.032; FLA. STAT. § 776.012. Cf. Caple, 753 So. 2d at 54; Smith, 507 So. 2d at 
1092.  
 148. 2005 Fla. Laws ch. 27. 
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